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THE "LESSONS OF VIETNAM": A CORRECTION
Mattei Ion Radu*

INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of Saigon in April 1975, scholars, politicians, military
officers, government officials, and commentators have attempted to
elucidate the "lessons" of the Vietnam War.' The ongoing conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan have infused this project with fresh vigor and
purpose. 2 Joining this debate in 2005 in Foreign Affairs, Melvin R.
Laird sought specifically to apply the lessons of Vietnam to the Iraq
War.3 He took U.S. policymakers to task for failing to establish a le* Ryan Research Fellow in Law, Villanova University School of Law; LL.M. Candidate, New
York University School of Law; M.A., London School of Economics; J.D., Villanova University
School of Law; B.A., Villanova University. On May 7, 2010, after the DePaul Law Review accepted this Article for publication, Mattei Ion Radu died, suddenly and unexpectedly, of natural
causes. With the permission of his estate and family, Professor Robert T. Miller of Villanova
University School of Law worked with the editors of the DePaul Law Review to see this Article
through to completion. Professor Miller thanks Mr. Radu's parents, Valentin and Donna Radu,
for allowing him to perform this last service for Mr. Radu, whom he was honored to call a
colleague, fellow scholar, and friend.
1. See, e.g., Memorandum from Smyser to Secretary of State Kissinger, Lessons of Vietnam
(May 12, 1975) (on file with Gerald R. Ford Library), available at http://www.ford.utexas.edul
library/exhibits/vietnam/750512a.htm;

CLARENCE

MARINEY,

VIETNAM:

LESSONS

LEARNED

(1989), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/report/1989/MC.htm; David
Fromkin & James Chace, What Are the Lessons of Vietnam?, 63 FOREIGN Ave. 722 (1984); see
generally THE REAL LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR: REFLECIONS TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF SAIGON (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2002); TIMOTHY J.
LOMPERIs, FROM PEOPLE'S WAR TO PEOPLE'S RULE: INSURGENCY, INTERVENTION, AND THE
LESSONS OF VIETNAM (1996); ROBERT S. McNAMARA & BRIAN VANDEMARK, IN RETROSPECT:
THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM (1996); VIETNAM RECONSIDERED: LESSONS FROM A
WAR (Harrison E. Salisbury ed., 1984); MICHAEL LIND, VIETNAM: THE NECESSARY WAR
(1999). Even President Richard Nixon, in post-Watergate retirement, offered views on the subMORE VIETNAMS (1985).
2. See generally IRAQ AND THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM, OR, How NOT To LEARN FROM THE
PAST (Lloyd C. Gardner & Marilyn B. Young eds., 2007); RuFus PHILLIPS, WHY VIETNAM MATTERS: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF LESSONS NOT LEARNED (2008); VIETNAM IN IRAQ: TACTICS, LESSONS, LEGACIES AND GHOSTS (John Dumbrell & David Ryan eds., 2007); Mark

ject. See generally RICHARD NIXON, No

Atwood Lawrence, The Uses of Vietnam in the Age of Terrorism, 59 INT'L J. 919 (2004); Dale
Andrade, Three Lessons from Vietnam, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2005, at A23; Evan Thomas &
John Barry, The Surprising Lessons of Vietnam, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 2009, at 34; George
Packer, What Obama and the GeneralsAre Reading, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 8, 2009, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2009/10/what-obama-and-the-generals-

are-reading.html.
3. See Melvin R. Laird, Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (2005).
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gitimate government in South Vietnam ("SVN"), cautioning that the
United States must not repeat this fundamental mistake in Iraq. 4 In
support of his charge that the United States created a "puppet" government in South Vietnam, Laird alleged, "In Vietnam, an American,
Ambassador Philip Habib, wrote the constitution in 1967. Elections
were choreographed by the United States to empower corrupt, selfish
men who were no more than dictators in the garb of statesmen." 5
Laird's experience with and knowledge of the Vietnam War are undoubtedly considerable. 6 As Secretary of Defense in the first Nixon
Administration, his primary task was winding down the U.S. role in
that conflict.7 However, while Laird's major claim about governmental illegitimacy in Saigon may well be correct, his specific assertions
about the SVN constitution and elections stand in stark contrast to the
historical record. 8 As James McAllister has demonstrated, the United
States did indeed commit an error in the 1967 elections; however it
was one of inaction, not manipulation. 9 Using archival material, this
Article will similarly offer needed clarification of the precise nature of
U.S. policy towards the SVN constitution of 1967.
It is natural for decision makers to look to historical precedents in
deciding how to deal with current problems.10 During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy famously consulted The Guns
of August, Barbara Tuchman's classic account of the outbreak of the
First World War," while President Lyndon B. Johnson seems to have
been heavily affected in his own choices about Vietnam by the experience of Munich 1938.12 Though the benefits of looking to the past for
guidance can be easily overstated, the practice has its place in analy4. See id. at 34-35.
5. Id.
6. See LEwIs SORLEY, A BETTER WAR: THE UNEXAMINED VICTORIES AND FINAL TRAGEDY
YEARS IN VIETNAM 32 (1999).

OF AMERICA'S LAST

7. See DALE VAN ArrA, WITH HONOR: MELVIN LAIRD IN WAR, PEACE, AND POLITICS 147

(2008).
8. Contentions that the SVN government lacked organic roots are frequent in Vietnam War
inquests. See, e.g., William B. Pickett, Vietnam, 1964-1973: An American Dilemma, 56 J. MIL.
HIST. 113, 115 (1992) (noting Norman Graebner's conclusion that the "Saigon government was
an 'artificial entity"').
9. See James McAllister, "A Fiasco of Noble Proportions": The Johnson Administration and
the South Vietnamese Elections of 1967, 73 PAC. HisT. REV. 619 (2004).
10. See generally JEFFREY RECORD, MAKING WAR, THINKING HISTORY: MUNICH, VIETNAM,

(2002).
11. See Richard Holbrooke, The Guns of August, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2006, at A23; see also
Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President Kennedy (Oct. 13, 1962), in
11 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, at 26, 27 (1996) (showing that a
Kennedy Administration official discussed The Guns ofAugust with a Soviet ambassador).
12. See Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The History of a Lesson: Versailles, Munich and the Social
Construction of the Past, 29 REV. INT'L STUD. 499, 504 (2003).
AND PRESIDENTIAL USES OF FORCE FROM KOREA To Kosovo
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However, in order for the "lessons learned" to have any actual
utility, the history of the event being studied must be correctly described.14 A reconsideration of the interaction of Washington and Saigon concerning the drafting of the 1967 SVN constitution may thus be
beneficial.
There are additional reasons to undertake such a review. Despite
the immense amount of academic literature on U.S. involvement in
Vietnam, the particular topic this Article will explore has apparently
received little attention.15 While there is some material on related issues, there does not seem to be one piece of scholarship that focuses
solely on U.S. policy towards the SVN constitution of 1967.16 Even
William Conrad Gibbons's magisterial treatment does not give the
matter substantial attention.' 7
The subject covered here also raises the issue of constitution-building, specifically the issues of when the U.S. government has sought to
influence the drafting of the constitutions of foreign states, what its
goals have been in these processes, and how it has endeavored to
achieve them.'8 This area of inquiry has received considerable coverage in both legal and historical academic forums,19 though perhaps not
SiS.1 3

13. See, e.g., ERNEST R. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(1981);

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN

(1986).
14. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, Munich After 50 Years, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 165 (1988); Lewis
Sorley, The Real Afghan Lessons from Vietnam, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2009, available at http://on
("Lessons learned
line.wsj.comlarticle/SB10001424052748703746604574463024150622310.html
from the past are only as good as our understanding of the past.").
15. For an excellent summary of recent historiography on the Vietnam War, see MARK
TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS

MOYAR, TRIUMPH FORSAKEN: THE VIETNAM WAR, 1954-1965 (2006); see also Christopher T.

Fisher, Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A Historiography,74 PAC. HIST. REV. 441 (2005).
16. See McAllister, supra note 9, at 619; see also Christopher T. Fisher, The Illusion of Progress: CORDS and the Crisisof Modernizationin South Vietnam, 1965-1968,75 PAC. HIST. REV.
25 (2006); Michael E. Latham, Redirecting the Revolution?: The USA and the Failure of NationBuilding in South Vietnam, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 27 (2006).
17. See WILLIAM CONRAD GIBBONS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE VIETNAM WAR: EXEC.
UTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS PART IV JULY 1965-JANUARY 1968, at

410-12 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Writing Other Peoples' Constitutions, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 167 (2008); Wiktor Osiatynski, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 244 (2003); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Into the Heart of the State: Intervention
Through Constitution-Making,8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 315 (1994).
19. See, e.g., THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN'S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

(2000);

KoSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION

(Ray A. Moore ed. &

trans., 1997); EDMUND SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM: AMERICAN POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON THE FRAMING OF THE WEST GERMAN BASIC LAW

81-105 (2001); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul ...

:

Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1139 (2007); Erich J. Hahn,
U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949, in AMERICAN POLICY AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WEST GERMANY, 1945-1955, at 21-44 (Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn & Her-

1010

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1007

enough, 20 particularly considering that the U.S. government continues
to be involved in the drafting of constitutions for other nations. 21
However, the experience of the U.S. government and the 1967 SVN
constitution is apparently absent from these studies as well. Presenting the actual U.S. posture towards the drafting of the SVN constitution in 1967 will fill a hole in the literature. It will also add a note of
caution to those, like Laird, who seek to portray the relationship between the United States and SVN as simply one of a dominant power
dictating commands to its client state. 22
In approaching the creation of the SVN constitution in 1966-67, the
United States adopted a middle course between seeking to dictate
every line that would appear in the document and adopting a completely hands-off attitude towards the process. 23 On the one hand,
U.S. policymakers considered the drafting of a constitution and the
transition to a representative constitutional government in SVN major
goals.24 Thus, even before the SVN Constituent Assembly ("CA")
began work, U.S. officials had a set of core principles they wished the
mann-Josef Rupieper eds., 1993); Ulrich K. Preuss, Perspectives on Post-Conflict
Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through External Constitutionalization, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 467 (2006); Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of ConstitutionalIdeas, 37
CONN. L. REV. 907 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,45 DUKE
L.J. 364, 364-65 (1995) (noting "gap[s] in the literature").
21. See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The Fatal Flaws in the U.S. ConstitutionalProjectfor Iraq,
61 J. INT'L AFF. 153 (2007); Michael Schoiswohl, Linking the InternationalLegal Framework to
Building the Formal Foundations of a "State at Risk": Constitution-Making and International
Law in Post-Conflict Afghanistan, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (2006) (confirming United
States influence on the Afghan constitution-making process); Michael J. Stepek, The Importance
of Commercial Law in the Legal Architecture of Post-Conflict "New" States, 60 ME. L. REV. 487,
507 n.85 (2008) (explaining U.S. involvement in the creation of the Bosnian constitution).
22. See Laird, supra note 3, at 35 ("Those who call the new Iraqi government Washington's
'puppet' don't know what a real puppet government is."); see also JAMES M. CARTER, INVENTING VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES AND STATE BUILDING, 1954-1968 (2008) (depicting the
South Vietnamese as basically pawns in hands of Americans). Critics have scrutinized United
States performance in the Vietnam War from a number of other perspectives, including the cultural, institutional, and military. See, e.g., C. DALE WALTON, THE MYTH OF INEVITABLE US
DEFEAT IN VIETNAM (2002); JEFFREY RECORD, THE WRONG WAR: WHY WE LOST IN VIETNAM
(1998); R.W. KOMER, BUREAUCRACY DOES ITS THING: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON U.S.GVN PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM (1998); George C. Herring, "PEOPLES QUITE APART": AMERICANS, SOUTH VIETNAMESE, AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 14 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 1 (1990).
23. See Telegram from Ball to American Embassy Saigon [hereinafter Saigon] (Sept. 23, 1966)
(on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter NARA]).
24. See Letter from Komer to Katzenbach (Jan. 11, 1967) (on file with Declassified Documents Reference System [hereinafter DDRS]); Telegram from Secretary of State to Ambassador, Saigon (Jan. 31, 1967) (on file with DDRS); Memorandum from Harriman to President
Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk (Oct. 14, 1966), in 4 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1964-1968, at 726, 726 (1998) [hereinafter 4 FRUS].

2011] THE "LESSONS OF VIETNAM": A CORRECTION 1011
SVN constitution to contain. 25 During the drafting process, the U.S.
government monitored the CA's activities and analyzed the form that
the constitution was taking. 26 In speaking with CA delegates, Saigon
embassy personnel and other U.S. government representatives made
the case for including those provisions deemed essential by U.S.
policymakers and rejecting the ones adjudged truly problematic. 27
On the other hand, however, U.S. officials refused to seek to influence those portions of the constitution not considered vital by Washington. 28 Moreover, they recognized that the U.S. government could
not realize all of its wishes for the document, even some they viewed
as very important.29 Indeed, the SVN constitution promulgated on
April 1, 1967, contradicted U.S. plans in several vital respects.30
"Flexible Response" was the name chosen by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations for their national security policy.31 As has been
correctly noted, U.S. practice in Vietnam did not live up to the theoretical goals of this defense strategy in important ways. 32 However, in
describing U.S. policy towards the drafting and promulgation of the
1967 SVN constitution, the term "flexible response" does seem to be
merited.
25. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966) (on file with NARA).
26. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Dec. 12, 1966) (on file with NARA);
Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1967) (on file with NARA); Directorate of
Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum, South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly: A Preliminary
Appraisal (Oct. 25, 1966) (on file with DDRS); Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Feb. 18,
1967) (on file with NARA) ("It would be helpful to us if [the] Embassy CA watchers could
include in their reporting a breakdown of the vote on key constitutional provisions.").
27. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 26, 1967) (on file with DDRS).
28. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Oct. 12, 1966) (on file with NARA).
29. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Feb. 7, 1967) (on file with NARA)
("While single-member constituency technique has disadvantages, we believe that opportunity
for changing or significantly altering this constitutional provision has passed.").
30. See AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT DOCUMENTs 1967, at 897-909 (1969) [hereinafter CURRENT DOCUMENTS].
31. See Jon LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 197-234 (rev. ed. 2005); 5
LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, RONALD D. LANDA & EDWARD J. DREA, HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY, 1961-1965, at 293-322 (2006); RONALD E. POWASKI, THE COLD WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1917-1991, at
140-42, 169 (1998); JANE E. STROMSETH, THE ORIGINS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: NATO's DEBATE OVER STRATEGY IN THE 1960s (1988). For skepticism as to how much Kennedy and Johnson Administration officials actually believed in the strategy, see Francis J. Gavin, The Myth of
Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe During the 1960s, 23 INT'L HIsT. REV. 847
(2001); INGO TRAUSCHWEIZER, THE COLD WAR U.S. ARMY: BUILDING DETERRENCE FOR Limwas a deliberately ambiguous doctrine . . . .").
ITED WAR 114 (2008) ("Flexible Response ...
32. See GADDIS, supra note 31, at 235-71; see also Walter A. McDougall, Contra Globalization and U.S. Hegemony, in FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES 6, 124 (Thomas H. Henriksen ed., 2001) ("Vietnam besmirched
).
Kennedy's and Johnson's flexible response and counterinsurgency ....
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SVN

AS

A MAJOR U.S. OBJECTIVE

Among the top priorities of the Johnson Administration in Vietnam
were creation of a constitution for SVN and the transition to constitutional government.33 When on July 28, 1965, President Lyndon B.
Johnson publicly announced his decision to make a major military
commitment to the defense of SVN against communism, the political
situation in that country was not good. 34 A series of coups and attempted coups in Saigon culminated in the June 12, 1965 toppling of
the civilian leadership by the SVN military.35 A group of officers took
control of the SVN government and established a military directorate
(the Directorate), with Nguyen Cao Ky as prime minister and Nguyen
Van Thieu as chief of state. 36
From early on in the U.S. war effort, a rectification of this state of
affairs was viewed by U.S. officials as very important.37 On February
7 and 8, 1966, representatives of the U.S. government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam ("GVN") met at Honolulu for the
purpose of discussing the non-military aspects of the war.3 8 The high
level delegations, which included President Johnson and Chief of
State Thieu, reached a number of conclusions and agreed on a plan
for further action. 39 At the Honolulu conference, the SVN leaders
assured the U.S. government of their intention to establish democratic
government in their country, while the U.S. representatives in turn
confirmed their support for open and honest elections in SVN. 40
33. See Letter from Taylor to President Johnson (Jan. 30, 1967), in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968, at 64, 69, 72 (2002) [hereinafter 5 FRUS].
34. See WILLIAM CONRAD GIBBONS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE VIETNAM WAR: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS PART III JANUARY-JULY 1965 (Comm.
Print 1988); FREDRIK LOGEVALL, CHOOSING WAR: THE LOST CHANCE FOR PEACE AND THE
ESCALATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM 333-74 (1999); MOYAR, supra note 15, at 350-416; Dror

Yuravlivker, "Peace Without Conquest": Lyndon Johnson's Speech of April 7, 1965, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 457, 458 (2006); President Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential News Conference:
Why We Are in Viet-Nam (July 28, 1965), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 794 (1966).

35. See GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 49 (1978).
36. See Memorandum for Bundy (Jan. 7, 1966) (on file with DDRS); JOHN PRADOS, VIETNAM: THE HISTORY OF AN UNWINNABLE WAR, 1945-1975, at 188-21 (2009).
37. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Nov. 22, 1965) (on file with NARA).
38. See Telegram from Department of State to American Embassy in Korea (Feb. 5, 1966), in

4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 214, 214.
39. See Editorial Note, in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 215.
40. See Paper Prepared by Bundy, Honolulu Meeting: Record of Conclusions and Decisions
for Further Action (Feb. 23, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 246, 250.
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The GVN promised to select an advisory council that was truly representative of the country's people to draft a constitution. 4 1 The delegates charged the U.S. Embassy in Saigon (the Embassy) with
monitoring the advisory council appointment process. 4 2 The representatives agreed that both the GVN and the Embassy were responsible for seeing that these constitutional plans came to fruition. 4 3 The
summit participants wanted to have the SVN constitution and popular
referendum on the document completed by the end of 1966.44 According to the conclusions and goals reached at Honolulu, elections
for a government based on this constitution were to follow. 45 However, although U.S. policymakers certainly considered these political
objectives important, President Johnson stressed at the meetings that
the United States did not wish the GVN to move faster towards constitutionalism than would be prudent. 46
In a March 2, 1967 letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President
Johnson stated, "[Tihe bringing to life within the next six months of a
constitutional government in Saigon is as important to us as the course
of military events in the field." 4 7 In that same month, top U.S. and
SVN leaders met in Guam. 4 8 There, the President expressed to Thieu,
Ky, and the other SVN representatives his views on the significance of
the constitutional development taking place in their country and the
importance of the CA's work on the constitution. 4 9 He also indicated
how happy he was to observe a democratic polity being constructed
and stressed how eager the United States was to help in the project.5 0
President Johnson's emphasis on a democratic constitution and free
elections established the tone and theme for the day's proceedings.5 1
Secretary Rusk was in full agreement with the President on the importance of establishing democratic constitutionalism in SVN. 5 2 In
December 1966, Rusk met with Thieu, Ky, and the GVN's foreign
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 247, 250.
44. See id. at 250.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 251.
47. Letter from President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk (Mar. 2, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra
note 33, at 226, 226.
48. See Memorandum for the Record, Working Notes on First Day's Session of Guam Conference (Mar. 20, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at 268.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 272.
51. See id. at 268.
52. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Department of State (Dec. 11, 1966), in 4
FRUS, supra note 24, at 925, 925.
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minister Tran Van Do. 5 3 He stressed to them how critical it was to
have a problem-free transition to a constitutional government. 54 In
response to Ky's view that the common people of his country did not
greatly value a constitution as such, Rusk contended that the political
process could be crucial, both in improving the GVN's image on the
world stage and in fostering cooperation among the disparate groups
in SVN. 55 The following month, in a secret telegram to Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in Saigon, Rusk again emphasized the enormous importance he attached to the "transition to a representative
constitutional government in South Viet Nam." 56 He maintained that
political development must serve as an essential complement to victories on the battlefield in the struggle against the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong.57
Sub-cabinet officials shared the concern that SVN make the shift to
constitutional democracy.58 On February 21, 1966, Walt W. Rostow,
head of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State and later
special assistant to the President, sent a confidential memo to President Johnson and Rusk.59 In it, Rostow recommended that the U.S.
government help organize a multi-country educational trip on constitutional and political issues for those tasked with drafting the SVN
constitution.60 As one of the "significant purposes" the journey might
serve, he listed the following: "[T]he trip would dramatize to the
world that the appropriate route to political peace and order in South
Viet Nam is via the creation of a constitutional democracy and free
elections rather than a negotiated coalition government, without roots
in an electoral process." 61
Rostow went on to say in an April 1966 eyes-only memorandum to
the President that if the GVN weathered the political crisis it was then
facing and the drafting group for the constitution was established as
planned, "we will have passed a great turning point." 62 After the Ky
regime did survive the spring 1966 political emergency to which Ros53. See id.
54. See id. at 927.
55. See id.
56. Telegram from Secretary of State to Ambassador, Saigon (Jan. 31, 1967), supra note 24.
57. See id.
58. See Action Memorandum from Rostow to Secretary of State Rusk, A Political Proposal
for Viet Nam: Putting the Democracy Building Council on the Road (Feb. 21, 1966) (on file with
NARA).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson (Apr. 5, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note
24, at 329, 329.
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tow referred, he recommended the issuing of a high-level U.S. government statement indicating happiness with the forward movement
toward constitutional democracy that had occurred in SVN. 6 3 In January 1967, Rostow communicated to President Johnson how important it was that agreement be reached on the constitution among the
different SVN leaders.6"
Similar views were held by others in the Johnson Administration. 65
In a top secret memorandum on October 14, 1966, Ambassador at
Large Averell Harriman wrote of "[tihe importance we place on the
constitutional process [in SVN] with the emergence of a government
that has legitimate roots." 66 In Harriman's prediction, the realization
of constitutional government in Saigon would bolster the global position of both the GVN and the U.S. government in significant ways. 67
At the beginning of 1967, Robert W. Komer, then special assistant to
President Johnson and later head of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam, listed the promulgation of a constitution as one of the U.S. government's chief Vietnam
priorities for that year.68 In January 1967, General Maxwell Taylor,
special consultant to the President and former ambassador to Saigon,
reported on his recent visit to SVN. 69 He wrote, "Although I have
mentioned the favorable progress toward constitutional government,
success in this field is so critical that all remaining problems related to
it should be watched closely to assure timely resolution."70
It is clear that U.S. policymakers considered the establishment of a
constitutional order in SVN as a major goal to be achieved, though at
times there is evidence in the documentary record that suggests that
this high-minded belief in democracy and constitutionalism was tem63. See Paper Prepared by Rostow, Headings for Decision and Action: Vietnam (Apr. 14,
1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 347, 347.
64. See Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson (Jan. 10, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra
note 33, at 32, 32. At another point, Rostow suggested that America's leading political and
military officials in Vietnam "should take Thieu up on a mountain and let him see what a grand
role he could play if he took over the Vietnamese military and modernized them for the long pull
while keeping unity and backing the constitutional process." Memorandum from Rostow to
President Johnson (Feb. 20, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at 198, 198-99 (emphasis added).
65. See Memorandum from Harriman to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk (Oct.
14, 1966), supra note 24, at 726.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68, Letter from Komer to Katzenbach (Jan. 11, 1967), supra note 24.
69. See Letter from Taylor to President Johnson (Jan. 30, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at
64,64.
70. Id. at 72.
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pered by hard-nosed realism.71 While U.S. officials wished very much
to see SVN turn into a constitutional democracy, they also acknowledged the importance of a stable regime that was able to carry out the
war against the North Vietnamese communists competently. 72 Similarly, while this Article will show that in practice the U.S. government
respected SVN independence in the creation of its basic law to a considerable extent, the public and private statements of U.S. officials on
this point were not always consistent.73
71. See Memorandum from Rostow to Secretary of State Rusk (Feb. 21, 1966), supra note 58;
see also Memorandum from Rostow to Secretary of State Rusk, Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum (Apr. 9, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 338, 338 ("We are a nation that cannot use force
to shoot people apparently demanding a constitution and free elections; and we cannot support
for long governments that do this."); Memorandum by Lansdale, The Battleground in 1967
(Nov. 8, 1966) (on file with DDRS) (noting that while the "new Constitution for Viet Nam
probably will contain beautiful and profound precepts[,] [t~he precepts will have to be honored
by the government and the people, if these precepts are to live"); Telegram from Lodge to President Johnson (Mar. 15, 1967) (on file with DDRS).
72. See Memorandum from Taylor to President Johnson, Current Situation in South Viet-Nam
(Apr. 12, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 340, 341 ("The problem is to restore order in South
Viet-Nam under a cooperative government capable of an effective prosecution of the war, while
progressing toward a constitutional, freely elected government."); Action Memorandum from
Rostow to Secretary of State Rusk (Feb. 21, 1966), supra note 58 (showing that Rostow hoped
that his proposed trip "would dramatize to the world the seriousness of Ky's government in
finding constitutional and political party arrangements that promised to reconcile an important
degree of democratic procedure with political stability."); see also Memorandum for Bundy (Jan.
7, 1966), supra note 36.
73. In response to an inquiry by a law school librarian about what books would be available to
the SVN constitution drafters, the U.S. Office of the Legal Adviser wrote, "As you know, the
constitution will be written by the 117-member assembly which was chosen in the September 11
election, and the role played by the United States Government in this process will be quite
limited." Letter from Feldman to Blaustein (Sept. 13, 1966) (on file with NARA). Similarly, in a
January 22, 1967 discussion with CA deputies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Leonard S.
Unger asserted that U.S. policymakers understood that the writing of the SVN constitution was a
Vietnamese concern and that it was incumbent upon the Vietnamese people to craft a suitable
document. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 23, 1967), supra note 168. However, although he did so politely, Unger did go on at that very meeting to offer U.S. views on a
key provision of the draft SVN constitution. See id. On April 12, 1966, in a secret memorandum
for President Johnson, General Taylor described the present U.S. goals as establishing a stable
regime in Saigon that could fight the communists effectively and moving SVN towards constitutional democracy. See Memorandum from Taylor to President Johnson (Apr. 12, 1966), supra
note 72, at 341. In that communication, Taylor opined that "[t]he ideal would be an indigenous
Vietnamese solution without visible U.S. participation. This does not mean U.S. neutrality toward the issues involved-we have too much at stake." Id. At other times U.S. leaders and
officials could evince a far more cavalier attitude towards SVN independence. For example, at
an April 1966 meeting of top U.S. policymakers, President Johnson voiced his concerns about an
SVN constitution-drafting body and stated that he would prefer an assembly America could
"control" to one that had been seized by the communists. See Notes of Meeting (Apr. 4, 1966),
in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 323, 323. Later that year, at a conference of sub-cabinet officials,
Ambassador Harriman advocated observing constitutional developments in SVN carefully and
"not permit[ting]" the GVN to produce a constitution that would run contrary to the guarantees
of national reconciliation articulated in the Manila Communiqud. See Memorandum of Meeting
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III.

INITIAL

U.S. VISION

AND PLANS FOR THE

SVN

CONSTITUTION

Before the CA began its drafting work, the U.S. government already had identified a number of provisions it considered indispensable in an SVN constitution.7 4 As early as May 16, 1966, President
Johnson was in possession of a briefing paper, prepared by Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Leonard S. Unger, entitled "Principles
Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional
Assembly in South Viet Nam" (the Principles).75 Washington sent a
copy of this paper to the Embassy's personnel for information purposes and guidance.76
The Principles called for the Embassy to exert maximum influence
in attempting to attain the specific goals outlined in the paper.7 7 However, U.S. officials were instructed to prevent, to the extent possible,
anti-American sentiment from becoming a major problem. 78 The
Principles recognized that the United States "shall be accused of interference in any event," but cautioned, "(I]t is vitally important not to
give potential anti-American elements (or the press and outside observers) any clear handle to hit [the U.S. government] with." 79
According to the Principles, U.S. policymakers wanted the CA elections to be held on schedule, by September 15, 1966, and all SVN
groups not actively participating in the communist insurgency to be
(Nov. 10, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 820, 820. At the same time, the U.S. government
was wary of accusations of interventionism. See Memorandum from Taylor to President Johnson
(Apr. 12, 1966), supra note 72, at 341 ("But we can do little in the open other than support the
principle of an eventual constitutional government without incurring the charge of intervention
and the blame for Vietnamese governmental failures."); Action Memorandum from Rostow to
Secretary of State Rusk (Feb. 21, 1966), supra note 58 ("The Vietnamese government should
charter a large jet aircraft-preferably from, say, Japan or Australia rather than the U.S.-to
emphasize its independence and to minimize the notion the Council is traveling under U.S. guidance or pressure."); see also Memorandum by the Department of State, Political Tactics in
Vietnam over Next Few Months (Apr. 1966) (on file with DDRS). More importantly, the Johnson Administration did seem to recognize the importance of an organic solution to the challenges posed in Vietnam. See Letter from Taylor to President Johnson (Jan. 30, 1967), supra
note 33, at 72 ("To have maximum lasting effect, [the establishment of constitutional government
in SVN] must be a genuine Vietnamese success without direct U.S. influence or involvement in
shaping the outcome."); Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
(Mar. 30, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 312, 313 ("We face the fact that we ourselves
cannot succeed except in support of the South Vietnamese.").
74. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25.
75. See Memorandum for the Record, in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 388, 388 n.1.
76. See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam (May 25, 1966), in
4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 403, 403.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
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fairly represented in the constitution-drafting body.80 The Principles
made clear that the Johnson Administration considered it vital that
the CA elections be open and honest, so that the GVN's reputation
was improved to the greatest extent possible, both in America and
globally.8 ' The Principles directed U.S. officials to focus their efforts
on seeing qualified individuals elected to write the basic law; any
worry about developing healthy political parties was deemed premature. 82 Prior to the CA elections, the Embassy was to "work quietly
with selected promising candidates all across the political spectrum in
the expectation that some will be elected to the assembly and provide
useful continuing contacts."83 The U.S. government hoped to employ
the CA election process as a tool for educating and involving the SVN
people in democracy. 84 Finally, the Principles charged Americans on
the ground in SVN with discouraging any attempt by the military directorate to create a government party whose sole purpose was keeping the generals in control to the exclusion of other important
elements of SVN politics. 85
At the beginning of September 1966, Ambassador Lodge, expressing the opinions of the whole Embassy, cabled Rusk with a statement
of his views concerning both the chief U.S. goals for the SVN constitution and the flexible approach that he and Embassy personnel advocated that the U.S. government adopt towards the drafting process. 86
Lodge explained that these recommendations for the document were
a fusion of the U.S. Interdepartmental Vietnam Planning Group's paper on the SVN constitution, views elicited from prominent SVN officials on what the constitution should contain, and the Embassy's own
thinking on the subject.8 7 However, before going into specific elements the United States wanted to see in the basic law, Lodge and the
Embassy staff made the following important general point:
We do not propose that we[ ] seek to influence every detail going
into the formation of the Vietnamese constitution. We should,
rather, concentrate on those features which we consider [absolutely]
necessary to the achievement of our [objectives] in Viet-Nam.
To the greatest extent possible, we should not try to prevent the
Vietnamese from drawing up a Vietnamese document-which they
will assuredly do anyway. This means being flexible about forms.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 403--04.
id. at 404.
id.
id.
Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25.
id. at 1.
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The Constitutional Assembly will be quite competent in its way, and
we believe our influence can be applied effectively, either directly
on its members or through the government with a minimum of fuss
and visibility.88
The first requirement for the SVN constitution articulated in the
telegram was that it provide for a powerful and secure executive. 89
Given the political and cultural realities they perceived in SVN, Lodge
and the other Embassy officials argued for a presidential system.90
However, they were willing to consent to the president-prime minster
hybrid found in South Korea, provided that the SVN cabinet could
not be exposed to excessive legislative pressure. 91 Apparently, the
former version of the executive had received the most support from
SVN leaders canvassed by the Embassy, though the latter had garnered serious attention as well. 2
Next, Lodge and the Embassy staff considered it essential that
under the SVN constitution the executive possess control over the
armed forces and enjoy adequate powers during times of emergency.93
They concluded that, among other requirements, the SVN president
must be the nation's commander-in-chief, as under the U.S. Constitution. 94 The cable expressed the U.S. objective in this matter to Washington in the following way: The "[i]mportant thing is to fold [the]
military into [the] governmental structure in such a way as to recognize their real power position, use their executive talents, and minimize [the] danger of coups." 95
As for emergency powers, Lodge and the Embassy wanted to avoid
a situation where the executive was constrained by the legislative
branch during a war crisis. 96 Consequently, they recommended that
the constitution contain broad emergency powers for the SVN presi88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1-2. Lodge and the Embassy justified their claim as follows:
We favor [a] presidential system because parliamentary systems generally work well
only where there are large, well-developed national parties. This is not [repeat] not
[the] case in Viet-Nam nor will it be for [a] long time. We think stability requires [a]
long term in office assured by [a] presidential system. We think [the] Vietnamese as a
people are short on [the] ability to compromise and tolerate, to take responsibility and
always see the national interest clearly, qualities which are essential to [the] success of
[a] parliamentary system, with its combining of legislative and executive power in the
same people.
Id.
91. See id. at 2.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 2-3.
94. See id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. See id.
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dent, including the ability to suspend the legislature and to promulgate orders that are legally binding if they involve matters relating to
war.97 While Lodge and the Embassy granted that such powers could
be circumscribed by the legislature, they cautioned that any legislative
veto of executive actions during emergencies should be difficult to
use. 9 8 Lodge and the other Embassy officials suggested that a twothirds majority vote in both houses might serve as a minimum threshold for any legislative action in such cases, or alternatively that there
be a cap on the amount of time for which the legislature could meet
during an emergency. 99 Lodge and the Embassy were frankly worried
about the potential susceptibility of the SVN legislature to "terroristic
pressure."100

The cable contained two final major U.S. goals for the SVN constitution.10 1 First, Lodge and the other Embassy officials stressed that it
should contain a bill of rights, a clear articulation of the democratic
nature of SVN, and a proclamation of the nation's purpose and collective ambitions.102 According to Lodge and the Embassy, the constitution ought to pledge that democracy will be allowed to grow and
flourish in the equitable peace for which the SVN were fighting. 03
Whatever guarantees the bill of rights made, Lodge and the Embassy
opined that at the very least, the provision could not run afoul of the
UN Declaration on Human Rights.104
Second, they also judged it vital that the SVN constitution adequately protect SVN's ethnic minorities.10 5 From the U.S. perspective, this meant that the document had to contain a promise that a
"citizen's right to his own ethnic and cultural traditions" would be
respected and that minorities would be equitably represented in the
national legislature.106 Lodge and the Embassy staff mused on ways
that the document could assure a minority voice in government: for
example, by reserving seats in the legislature for the ethnic minorities
or by selecting an upper chamber with a narrow set of responsibilities
that would advocate minority and other special interests. 0 7 They
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 2-3.
100. Id. at 3.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.

106. Id.
107. See id.
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were confident, however, that the CA could devise a formula on this
point that would be agreeable to the SVN minorities.108
Having articulated a constitutional floor, Lodge and the other Embassy officials spelled out several other features of the document that
the United States should try to influence if the essentials of U.S. government constitutional policy were assured. 109 They recommended
that the amendment process for the SVN constitution be fairly easy
and even that the document potentially be subject to comprehensive
review five years after ratification. 10 Lodge and the Embassy wanted
it to be quite hard under the constitution to remove either the president or a member of the legislature."' However, they thought it advisable that the president "have [the] right to prorogue [the]
legislature, call for new elections for major cause, and exercise the
item veto." 112
Possibly because they were concerned about would-be dictators,
Lodge and the Embassy staff counseled that the SVN president
should be restricted to either two terms of four years or one term of
five or six years. 113 The cable also contained some suggestions for
how the SVN constitution should handle the judiciary. 114 Despite the
long history of judicial review in American jurisprudence, Lodge and
the Embassy emphatically rejected such a power for the SVN lower
courts.1 15 They did, however, recommend a "provision for [the] Supreme Court to pass on [the] constitutionality of laws and executive
decrees once [the] war emergency is past." 116 Finally, Lodge and the
other Embassy officials thought it would be good if the document promoted the general idea of local government, with the specifics to be
spelled out later in legislation.' 17
Washington responded favorably to the policy laid out by Lodge
and the Embassy.118 A September 23, 1966, telegram from the Department of State noted, "We agree completely . . . that we should

concentrate our advice to [the] GVN and [the] Constituent Assembly
on [the] fundamental questions posed in [the] constitution drafting
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See
Id.
See
See

id.
id. at 3-4.
id. at 3.
id.
id. at 4.
id.
id.
id.
Telegram from Ball to Saigon (Sept. 23, 1966), supra note 23.
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process, and resist [the] temptation to try to press our views on every
detail."1 19 The cable, drafted by officials at the State Department's
Vietnam Working Group and sent under the name of Undersecretary
of State George W. Ball, affirmed that the recommendations offered
by Lodge and the Embassy on the SVN constitution, certain further
detailed comments that Lodge and the Embassy promised to send by
airgram, and the Vietnam Planning Group's paper would supply a
firm foundation for the U.S. posture toward the creation of the SVN
constitution. 120
The State Department expanded upon the analysis sent from Saigon on September 4 on two issues of importance to the U.S. government. 121 As to the emergency powers, the State Department
concurred that the SVN president should have extensive authority
during war crises.1 22 However, like Lodge and the Embassy, the State
Department wanted the language to be drafted precisely so as to prevent exploitation by the executive.123 While the State Department acknowledged the potential merit in the proposals put forth by Saigon to
make it difficult to exercise legislative power during a national emergency, 124 it added, "Another possibility might be to set [a] time limit
for [the] duration of emergency powers with [an] extension for [an]
additional specified period [that would be] subject to review by [the]
executive and legislative branches. "125
The September 23 cable to the Embassy also raised a subject that
would evolve into the U.S. government's single greatest problem with
the CA's drafting work: the anti-communism article.126 The State Department expressed the issue as follows:
Hopefully, [the] constitution about to be drafted will be [the] last
document although, as you point out, provisions will have to be
made for its amendment and possibly for [a] wholesale review in,
say, five years. If we are to look forward to dealing with [the] problem of [the] eventual reintegration of those under [Viet Cong
("VC")] control and influence into Vietnamese society and to [the]
gradual evolution toward [a] freer and broader political activity, we
believe that [the] constitution should avoid any language which explicitly outlaws communism or "pro-communist neutralism[.]" If
any treatment of this subject appears in [the] constitution, we would

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1.
See id.
See id. at
See id. at
See id.
See id. at
Id. at 2.
See id. at

1-3.
1.
1-2.
2-3.
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hope [that] it would be in terms of language conveying [the] idea of
"agents of foreign powers" or "those who seek to overthrow [the
government] by force" to describe treasonable individuals or activities. In this way, it will be easier in [the] future to make [a] distinction between hard core VC leadership and cadres, and rank and file
of population under VC control or whose ties with VC are tenuous
at best. 127
Washington acknowledged that it was hard to convince the SVN to
accept any solution other than forthrightly criminalizing their mortal
enemy, the communists.128 However, the State Department urged
that U.S. officials must attempt to persuade the SVN of the considerable benefits of magnanimity in this area.129
Summing up, then, it is clear that well before the CA began serious
drafting work, the U.S. government had a clear idea of the shape it
wished the SVN constitution to take and what provisions it considered
indispensable to U.S. policy in Vietnam,' 30 and these included a powerful and secure executive commanding the country's armed forces
and fortified with significant emergency powers, a bill of rights, a clear
affirmation of democracy, and protections for ethnic minorities.
IV.
A.

MAJOR ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES

The Anti-Communism Provision and National Reconciliation

No issue would vex U.S. officials more in conducting their policy
towards the SVN constitution in 1966-67 than that of the anti-communism article. As has been discussed, this matter was already on the
Department of State's radar on September 23, 1966.131 The Department again raised the issue in an October 28 telegram to Saigon.132 In
response to a draft constitution that outlawed "all actions profiting
communism or pro-communist neutralism," the Department worried
aloud that any such unequivocal bans would totally undercut U.S. efforts towards national reconciliation in SVN.1 33 The telegram advocated making the U.S. government's position on the anti-communism
article clear early on to both the GVN and significant CA delegates,
before the problem metastasized.134
127. Id. at 2.
128. See id. at 3.
129. See id.
130. See Editorial Note, in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at 30 n.2 (revealing that the CA wrote
substantive articles of the SVN constitution in November and December of 1966).
131. See Telegram from Ball to Saigon (Sept. 23, 1966), supra note 23.
132. See Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Oct. 28, 1966) (on file with NARA).
133. Id. at 1-2.
134. Id. at 2.
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The State Department asked for a reaction to these concerns from
the Embassy and received one on November 4.135 Lodge and his staff
reported frankly that there was a strong desire on the part of both the
GVN and CA for some sort of prohibition against communism and
"pro-Communism neutralism." 1 3 6 The successful banning of candidates representing such views from the CA elections was apparently
often cited by the SVN as a precedent. 137 Nevertheless, Lodge and
the Embassy had already begun discreet conversations with the GVN
and certain CA delegates that attempted to show the pitfalls of a
broad ban on communism and so-called pro-communist neutralism. 138
Lodge and the Embassy made the following recommendation:
On [the] basis [of the] preliminary reactions[,] we believe [the]
greatest chan[c]e for success lies in presenting some alternative concept of wording which . . . can satisfy [the] strong anti-communist

feeling in [the] CA and [the] GVN-a feeling which, with anticolonialism, has in one very real sense given birth to this nation.13 9
The telegram from Saigon contained two alternative ideas for constitutional language. 140 The first ran along the lines proposed by the Department of State, namely a provision outlawing all subversive
activities against the legitimate government that employed violent or
unlawful means and preventing anyone who advocated such violent
dissidence from running for office.141 The second suggestion granted
the SVN their anti-communism article, but inserted an additional provision on national reconciliation that would protect the rights and
privileges of all who genuinely abandoned communism.142
The realistic warning given by Lodge and the Embassy foreshadowed the long struggle by the United States against the inclusion of
sweeping anti-communist language in the SVN constitution. By November, other areas of the U.S. government were also worried about
the anti-communist article. 143 It was a major agenda item at a November 10 meeting, which included a special consultant to President Johnson and officials from the Departments of State and Defense.144
Ambassador Harriman recommended that U.S. policymakers watch
the constitution-making process in SVN carefully and voiced his con135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Nov. 4, 1966) (on file with NARA).
Id. at 1.
See id. at 1-2.
See id. at 2.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Memorandum of Meeting (Nov. 10, 1966), supra note 73, at 820.
See id. at 820, 824.
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cerns to the other attendees about the provision banning communists
and neutralists. 145 He stated plainly that the United States should
"not permit" the SVN government to draft a document that contradicted the guarantees that had been made as to national reconciliation.146 John P. Roche, the President's special consultant, opined that
it could be dangerous to delay applying pressure to the GVN in order
to get the type of constitution that the U.S. government could support. 147 There was general agreement among the meeting's participants that the United States must take steps to see national
reconciliation go forward, both in the SVN constitution and in the decrees and programs of the GVN.1 48
The next day, November 11, the Department of State sent a priority
cable to Saigon urging the Embassy to continue its attempts to quash
the anti-communism article. 149 In unmistakable language, the Department stated that "it [is] of [the] utmost importance that the
[c]onstitution create no institutional obstacles to [a] 'national reconciliation' program and that it represent a clear democratic alternative to
communism." 50 The officials at the Department argued that any outright ban of communism and pro-communist neutralism in the SVN
constitution would undercut the idea of national reconciliation in the
minds of both the SVN people and the global community. 51 They
"much prefer[red]" keeping any explicit condemnation of communism
out of the constitution to balancing an ideological ban with a guarantee of rights for those citizens who had truly renounced
communism. 152
By December 1966, this thinking on the anti-communism article
seems to have represented the general consensus of U.S. policymakers.15 3 A draft National Security Action Memorandum ("NSAM")
called for the United States to "[e]nsure that [the] new [SVN] Constitution is consistent with [the] reintegration of VC into the national

145. See id. at 820, 824-25.
146. See id. at 820.
147. See id. at 825.
148. See id. at 825-26.
149. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Nov. 11, 1966) (on file with
NARA).
150. Id. at 1.
151. See id. at 1-2.
152. Id. at 2.
153. See Draft National Security Action Memorandum, Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam (Dec. 10, 1966), in 4 FRUS, supra note 24, at 922, 923.
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life."1 54 President Johnson, who was sent the draft by Rostow on December 10, commented that "[i]t's good." 55
In early January 1967, the Embassy issued a "progress report" on
the CA and its work.156 It stated that the "final draft will undoubtedly
have shortcomings. The [anti]-Communist provisions may suffer from
[a] lack of subtlety, but will probably be much less objectionable than
might have been expected."157 On January 13, in a telegram conveying their views on the CA's first substantive draft, Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter and the Embassy expressed satisfaction that the
draft SVN constitution did not mention pro-communist neutralism
and opined that the anti-communist provisions and related language
in the document should be acceptable to the U.S. government.158
Despite this hopeful forecast, worries about the ideological ban and
its effect upon national reconciliation continued to animate U.S.
policymakers. 59 Indeed, the very next day after the Embassy in Saigon issued its positive appraisal of how the CA handled the anti-communism article, the Department of State cabled the Embassy on the
subject.160 Though Washington largely agreed with the Embassy's
analysis, it was still not totally happy with the CA's performance in
this regard: "[B]earing in mind our objectives with regard to national
reconciliation, we believe it would be desirable to replace [']communist['] with [']external['] to describe aggression in [the] Article ....
On January 20, 1967, instead of following the U.S. advice on the
issue, the CA overwhelmingly adopted a stronger anti-communism article than had appeared in the first draft constitution.162 It read as
follows: "1) The Republic of Viet-Nam opposes Communism in every
form. 2) Every activity designed to propagandize ... or carry out ...

Communist [sic] is prohibited." 163 In reporting this development,
Lodge and the Embassy stressed that they had repeatedly counseled
CA delegates to opt for less sweeping language when dealing with
communism in the SVN constitution and had laid out different wording options which they might choose.164 Despite having argued that
154. Id.
155. See id. at 922 n.1.
156. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 6, 1967) (on file with NARA).
157. Id. at 2.
158. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1967) (on file with NARA).
159. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 14, 1967) (on file with
NARA).
160. See id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 20, 1967) (on file with NARA).
163. Id. at 3.
164. See id
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excess in this area might harm the chances of national reconciliation,
Lodge and the Embassy staff were forced to admit that most CA
members cherished their anti-communist ideals and probably would
have favored even stronger anti-communist language than that finally
chosen.165
Labeling the CA's move as a "most unfortunate development," the
State Department asked the Embassy to offer promptly any solution it
might devise.166 The telegram revealed that the Department was seriously considering trying to convince the ruling generals in the Directorate to use the Directorate's controversial veto power to block the
anti-communism article, a move that under normal circumstances U.S.
officials would find highly unpalatable. 67 The response from Lodge
and the other Embassy officials painted a grim picture from the point
of view of changing or eliminating the ideological condemnation in
the SVN constitution.'16 The Embassy reminded Washington of its
previous assessment that there was strong desire in the CA to adopt
an even harsher anti-communist provision in the constitution, and the
Embassy warned that, if anything, the ruling generals in the Directorate were more disposed towards a harsher position than the CA.'6 9
Lodge expressed the hard judgment of the Embassy as follows: "At
this stage, we do not see any alternative but to accept [the] wording in
its present form."1170 Even sympathetic CA delegates had communicated to U.S. officials that there was simply no way to convince the
constitution-drafting body to drop its stance on the anti-communism
article.171 Lodge ended the Embassy's message on an emphatic note:
We appreciate [the Department's] concern[,] but as we have said
this is [an] issue on which both [the] government and [the] CA appear quite inflexible. We have discussed [the] matter thoroughly
with [a] number of key deputies and find no disposition to open
[the] question again. Directorate will almost certainly be even more
rigid. Therefore, we see no real value in raising [the] issue with
them. In fact[,] such [a] discussion might well raise suspicion [of]
our motives and prove damaging [to] our ability [to] influence them
on other aspects [of the] national reconciliation issue. 172
This reversal for U.S. policy occurred, as Lodge had indicated, despite the vigorous efforts by U.S. officials to convince the SVN leaders
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 3-4.
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 20, 1967) (on file with NARA).
See id. at 1-2.
See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 23, 1967) (on file with NARA).
See id. at 1.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 2.
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of the merits of the U.S. government's position on the anti-communism article.173 On January 19, 1967, the day before the CA adopted
the stronger language, Dr. Gisbert Flanz, a professor of politics at
New York University brought in by the Embassy to serve as a constitutional expert after having performed similar duties for South Korea, 174 engaged in a dinner conversation on the constitution with four
CA deputies and a GVN minister.'75 At the January 19 dinner, Flanz
offered a number of reasons why the anti-communism provision was
both unnecessary and potentially harmful. 176 He referenced the Korean experience, where the South Koreans had been involved in a
mortal struggle with communism but had the self-confidence to draft
their constitution without mentioning their ideological foe. 177 Flanz
also raised the idea that a direct discussion of the communists in the
constitution might well grant them more dignity than they deserved
and would certainly have deleterious consequences for SVN's reputation in the world. 78
Several days later, Unger tried his hand at persuasion.179 In speaking with two CA delegates and a former GVN prime minister, he
again touched on how the anti-communism article would hurt the
SVN's reputation, both in America and globally, and how it would
173. See Memorandum of Conversation, Draft Constitution (Jan. 19, 1967) (on file with
NARA); Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 26, 1967), supra note 27.
174. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Aug. 8, 1966) (on file with NARA). On
July 28, 1966, Prime Minister Ky indicated his interest in having the United States identify a
constitutional expert for the GVN. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (July 28,
1966) (on file with NARA). At another point, a CA delegate explained how the CA would have
to bring in an expert to aid in the actual writing of the constitution and intimated that help "from
our American friends" would be appreciated in this regard. Telegram from Saigon to Secretary
of State (Sept. 21, 1966), at 3 (on file with NARA). On November 29, Unger contacted the U.S.
embassy in France and asked for information on any French or Vietnamese person living in Paris
who might be able to serve as a constitutional expert in SVN. See Letter from Dean to Unger
(Dec. 2,1966) (on file with NARA). On December 2, the embassy sent Washington a number of
potential candidates, with brief descriptions and evaluations of their views of the war effort in
Vietnam. See id. U.S. government officials were not the only Americans who concerned themselves with the SVN constitution. On August 29, Albert Blaustein, a law professor and law
librarian at Rutgers University, wrote to Rusk inquiring about the books available to the CA and
offering some suggestions on the appropriate bibliography. See Letter from Blaustein to Secretary of State Rusk (Aug. 29, 1966) (on file with NARA). The Office of the Legal Adviser at the
Department of State responded shortly thereafter, assuring Blaustein that a considerable number of relevant works were available to SVN leaders. See Letter from Feldman to Blaustein
(Sept. 13, 1966), supra note 73. Among other measures, Vietnamese translations of the Federalist Papers were apparently to be distributed as an aid to the constitution-making process. See id.
at 2.
175. See Memorandum of Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 173.
176. See id. at 2.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 26, 1967), supra note 27.
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prove an obstacle to national reconciliation.18 0 As the Embassy had
suggested might occur, Unger was forced to clarify the U.S. position
on reconciliation and assuage SVN fears that such a policy would be
overly indulgent to the communist enemy.""1 However, while the CA
representatives approached by Flanz and Unger were somewhat
agreeable to the U.S. policy, the CA as a whole remained intractable
on the issue.182
Despite these discouraging developments, the U.S. government persisted in its efforts to see national reconciliation realized in SVN.1 8 3
In a February 18 cable to Saigon, the Department of State warned
Ambassador Lodge and the Embassy staff that the next danger to
avoid was a strong denunciation of communism in the constitution's
preamble, which U.S. officials concluded would exacerbate the harm
caused by the anti-communism article.' 8 4 Switching into damage-control mode on the provisions outlawing communism, the Department
instructed the Embassy to push for a major declaration on national
reconciliation to be paired with the promulgation of the SVN constitution.8 5 Beyond this, if the CA was determined to include the denunciation of communism in the preamble, Washington hoped for an
affirmation of national reconciliation in the same part of the
document. 8 6
The Embassy responded promptly to the Department's directions.187 Encouraged by the positive SVN reaction to the Embassy's
soundings, the Department provided three possible formulations of a
statement on national reconciliation in the constitution:
A. The provisions of this Constitution shall be applied in a spirit of
good will and National Reconciliation that will contribute to
the restoration of peace and the re-integration of the nation by
guaranteeing full civil and political rights, including the right to
run for elected office, and to engage in political activity, to all
those who renounce the use of force against the nation and are
prepared to abide by the nation's constitution.
B. The provisions of this Constitution shall be applied in a spirit of
good will and National Reconciliation so as to ensure that all
elements of the nation who wish to help construct a new Viet
Nam will be able to participate in the peaceful, democratic
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1-2.
id. at 2.
id. at 2-3; Memorandum of Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 173, at 2.
Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Feb. 18, 1967) (on file with NARA).
id. at 1.
id.
id. at 1-2.
Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Feb. 21, 1967) (on file with NARA).
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processes of the state on a basis of full equality irrespective of
ideology or past associations.
C. The provisions of this Constitution shall be applied in a spirit of
good will and National Reconciliation that will foster the development of a democratic society open to all persons of every
race, religion, and political philosophy who are prepared to
pursue their political objectives by peaceful and democratic
means in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 8 8
Washington made clear, however, that it remained opposed to any
anti-communist language in the preamble and that, of the three alternatives, it favored the strongest one that the Embassy could get the
SVN leadership to accept.18 9
By March 10, the Department of State had reason to hope that a
GVN proclamation on national reconciliation would be delivered on
the date Washington desired-the date of the constitution's promulgation.190 This prompted U.S. policymakers to renew their urging that

the SVN constitution's preamble contain an affirmation of national
reconciliation as robust as possible.191 The Embassy responded that
its personnel had been making the U.S. government's case for the inclusion of such positive language to members of both the CA and the
Directorate, but had not given out the State Department's detailed
textual proposals on national reconciliation.192
As Lodge explained in the confidential telegram,
We have consistently avoided giving either the government or CA
deputies any suggestions on specific wording to be included in the
constitution. Our feeling has been that it is better if the CA puts the
ideas we favor into the constitution in purely Vietnamese style and
form. Th[is] method also conceals our hand more effectively.193
In the Embassy's assessment, there was good reason to believe that a
pro-national reconciliation statement would be inserted into the preamble, though to SVN leaders it was apparently hardly the highest
priority. 194 Again, the SVN opposition to national reconciliation
seemed to stem in part from fears that the United States itself was
about to weaken its stance on communism and fail to guarantee adequately the independence of SVN.1 95
188. Id. at 1-2.
189. See id. at 1.
190. See Telegram from Department of State to Saigon (Mar. 11, 1967) (on file with NARA).
191. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Mar. 11, 1967) (on file with
NARA).
192. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Mar. 13, 1967) (on file with NARA).
193. Id. at 1.
194. See id. at 2.
195. See id.
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B. Elected Province Chiefs
Though the anti-communism article was probably the constitutional
issue most frequently addressed in the telegraphic traffic between
Washington and the Embassy in Saigon, there were certainly other
provisions in the SVN basic law about which U.S. policymakers worried. One was the matter of electing chiefs for the provinces, South
Vietnam's main political subdivisions. 19 6 In laying out its policy proposals for the SVN constitution on September 4, 1966, the Embassy
had endorsed as a non-essential goal the election of local governmental bodies, with the proviso that the specifics of such elections be left
to the legislature. 197 In general, the development of local political
power and participation was indeed an objective that the U.S. government wished to further. 198
However, by December 5, U.S. officials were reconsidering the extent to which they wanted to promote the principle of local government.199 In a secret memorandum, Robert H. Miller, head of the
State Department's Vietnam Working Group, acknowledged that
"[s]elf-government of reasonably sizeable urbanized places would appear an important goal to be realized." 200 However, he wondered
whether the CA's proposal to have province chiefs and mayors elected
by popular vote would falter in practice. 201 Specifically, Miller worried that such an arrangement could weaken the GVN's administrative system and worsen the already strained relationship between
civilians and military personnel in the rural areas of SVN. 2 0 2 As a
potentially viable alternative, he suggested that the GVN appoint
mayors and province chiefs with the input of municipal and provincial
councils that had been democratically elected. 203
Similar concerns were voiced in a December 9 cable to the Embassy, where the Department of State asked, "Would not elected
province and district chiefs lead to [a] serious breakdown of centralized administrative channels between [the] GVN and [the] provinces
and by default place on [the] military [the] entire burden of holding
[the] administration together?" 204 While Washington admitted that it
196. SVN had forty-four provinces. See Lewy, supra note 35, at 44-45.
197. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25, at 4.
198. See Memorandum from Miller to Unger, Constitutional Issues for Discussion by the Political Working Group, Tuesday, December 6 (Dec. 5, 1966) (on file with NARA).
199. See id. at 4-5.
200. Id. at 4.
201. See id. at 4-5.
202. See id. at 5.
203. See id.
204. Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Dec. 9, 1966), at 2 (on file with NARA).
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might be beneficial to place the aim of electing province and district
chiefs into the constitution for purely aspirational purposes, it nevertheless maintained that it would be better for the CA to focus on the
more realistic goal of widening the role of the provincial and municipal councils. 205
The Embassy agreed with the Department's analysis on the issue of
elected province chiefs. 206 While assuring Washington that the Embassy would counsel the CA to reject such a proposal, Deputy Ambassador Porter also tried to calm fears by pointing out that the SVN
president could always handle the problem through his emergency
powers. 207 The Embassy had to report honestly that there was widespread support among CA delegates for constitutional provisions for
local autonomy and decentralized power, though it opined that this
understandable desire could be adequately fulfilled by articulating a
non-specific guarantee of local self-government in the SVN
constitution. 208
Although there were numerous deputies who also worried about
the provision, the general sentiment in favor of local self-government
in the CA resulted in the December 1966 approval by a fair majority
of the principle of elected province chiefs. 209 Reacting to this, the
Embassy offered the Department of State a more detailed discussion
of the pitfalls of such an institution, at least during wartime. 210 It also
related some of the SVN fears on this point, including that the communist insurgents could elect one of their own in certain provinces
and essentially capture legal authority in those areas.211 Embassy officials did not, however, believe it was possible any longer to convince
the CA to strike the elected province chief provision entirely from the
205. See id.

206. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Dec. 13, 1966) (on file with NARA).
207. See id. at 1.
208. See id.

209. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Dec. 22, 1966) (on file with NARA).
210. See id. at 2-3. Porter and the Embassy staff argued that
[o]ne of the basic problems here has always been building ties and increasing communication between rural areas and [the] central government. Electing province chiefs
would tend [to] stimulate [the] conflict between [the] central government and [the]
provinces, encourage regional separatism, tend to further reduce [the] often deficient
central control of local administration, and multiply [the] difficulties of getting consistent and coordinated implementation of national policies in fields such as revolutionary
development. There is also the immediate problem of security and the need to ensure
coordination between provincial authorities and the military.
Id. at 3.
211. See id. at 2.
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document. 2 12 Instead, in their cable to Washington, Porter and the
Embassy proposed the following strategy:
In all our contacts with [the] deputies we are counseling that [the]
constitution could make it clear that [the] provision for elected
province chiefs is [a] principle which can be fully implemented only
in peacetime, that it is subject to modification or postponement as
required by the security situation, and that it is to be implemented
by future legislation when the situation permits.213
On December 23, the State Department registered its full agreement
with this recommendation. 2 14
However, in January 1967, U.S. officials continued to try to get the
CA to strike the democratic election of province chiefs from the SVN
constitution. 215 Displaying a considerable knowledge of history,
Roche (the president's special consultant) proposed the following solution to the province chief issue in a secret memorandum to Unger:
[T]here are ways out of the squabble over election of Province
Chiefs. The best bet would be to have the President nominate three
candidates and the Provincial Council choose one. Or-as in the
14th Century English system of choosing shire reeves-have the
provincial authorities nominate three and the President pick one.
(In either case, the selecting authority could turn down all three and
ask for a new panel.) There is a French precedent for this. A prefect has the right to fire an elected mayor but he cannot replace
him. The commune then holds a new election and hopefully sends
up another candidate. Occasionally (in Communist dominated
communes) a stalemate has developed, but by and large the system
has an effective deterrent capacity. 216
The Department of State duly passed on the suggestion to the Embassy for its use in talking with CA delegates. 2 17
212. See id. at 3.
213. Id. at 2.
214. See Telegram from Unger to Saigon (Dec. 23, 1966) (on file with NARA). Though it
actively tried to change the provision on elected province chiefs, the U.S. government did try to
have an open mind towards the issues involved. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State
(Jan. 6, 1967), supra note 156, at 2 ("Similarly, while we do not agree with direct election of
province chiefs at this time, we recognize local government provisions outlined by [the] CA are
also intended to solve [a] serious problem-the need for more responsive government and
greater popular participation in government.").
215. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 7, 1967) (on file with NARA);
Memorandum from Roche to Unger (Dec. 29, 1966) (on file with DDRS); Memorandum of
Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 173, at 3.
216. Memorandum from Roche to Unger (Dec. 29, 1966), supra note 215, at 1-2. In early
January 1967, Roche offered an assessment of the draft SVN constitution for Rostow and,
among other problems, flagged the issue of elected province chiefs. See Editorial Note, in 5
FRUS, supra note 33, at 30 n.2.
217. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 7, 1967), supra note 215.
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In his January 19 conversation with the SVN leaders, Flanz argued
that the election of province chiefs, while laudable in theory, was inappropriate when the nation was fighting a war. 218 He reiterated the
view, held by the U.S. government from the beginning, that the CA
ought to opt for a generalized affirmation of the principle of local selfgovernment over a detailed treatment of the subject. 219 Flanz also
tried to explain that village chief elections, which had apparently been
recently introduced by the GVN, were much easier to conduct than
province chief elections. 220 The CA representatives at the dinner
seemed to agree with Flanz, but they themselves admitted that the
four delegates were frequently in the minority during CA deliberations, especially on matters like elected province chiefs. 221 However,
the U.S. efforts seemed to pay off substantially when on March 10, the
CA approved an article under which the initial province chiefs would
be appointed by the first president elected under the constitution during his first term in office. 222 The Embassy expressed relief that the
province chief elections about which U.S. policymakers had worried
would not occur for up to four years. 223
C. Executive Powers/Declarationsof Emergency
From the outset, the U.S. government wanted to ensure that the
constitution granted the SVN executive sufficient authority, especially
during wartime. The issue of emergency powers figured prominently
in the initial set of telegrams on U.S. policy towards the SVN constitution between the Department of State and the Embassy in September
1966.224 U.S. officials continued to discuss various aspects of emergency powers during December, as the CA was actively engaged in
writing the provisions of the new constitution. 225
218. See Memorandum of Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 173, at 3.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Mar. 11, 1967), at 1 (on file with
NARA).
223. See id. at 1-2.
224. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25, at 1-3;
Telegram from Ball to Saigon (Sept. 23, 1966), supra note 23, at 1-2.
225. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Dec. 13, 1966), supra note 206, at 1
("Also, emergency powers [have] not yet [been] defined by [the] CA, but we believe [the] provisions for emergency powers will make it possible to use military on active duty in civil administrative and other jobs as [the] situation requires."). While U.S. policymakers were concerned
that the SVN executive would lack the proper imperatives during wartime, they also did not wish
to give the executive such expansive emergency powers that a dictatorship became a possibility.
See Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Dec. 15, 1966) (on file with NARA).
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Before the Embassy and the Department of State offered comprehensive analyses of the draft SVN constitution, there was already
unease in the telegraphic traffic about the emergency provisions. 226
On January 9, 1967, Porter reported that the draft article on the national assembly gave responsibility for declaring an emergency or curfew to the legislature. 22 7 If the CA did not change this scheme of its
own accord, he promised that the Embassy would advise the body to
give these prerogatives to the executive. 228 Porter expressed some
hope that it would not be necessary for the United States to get involved in this matter. 229
When the CA produced a first draft, the issues of emergency powers and presidential authority were at the forefront of U.S. concerns
about the document. 230 In a confidential cable to Washington, Porter
wrote,
[The] [d]raft's most objectionable feature is Article 39 which gives
the National Assembly excessive authority with respect to international relations and declaring [an] emergency. Powers granted to
[the] president by Article 78 enable him to declare [an] emergency
only when [the] National Assembly "cannot be convened in time".
And even then he has only three days to submit [the] declaration to
[the] Assembly for approval. These two articles need re-working to
restore to [the] chief executive normal authority with respect to international relations and emergency powers. 23 1
He assured the Department of State that the Embassy would make
precisely this case in its discussions with the CA and the GVN. 2 3 2
The Department fully concurred with the assessment offered by
Porter and the Embassy on executive authority and emergency powers. 233 It specifically stressed that the SVN legislature could not be
allowed to interfere substantially with any executive move to open
negotiations with the enemy or peace talks to end the war.2 3 4 Like
Embassy officials in Saigon, Washington wanted to see the constitution grant the executive more flexibility when dealing with emergen226. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 9, 1967) (on file with NARA).
227. See id. at 1.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1-2.
230. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1967), supra note 26, at 1.
231. Id.
232. See id. On January 25, the Embassy re-confirmed its position and its pledge: "[T]he President should have the normal powers with respect to emergencies and foreign affairs. We are
using our influence to help bring about the necessary changes to that end." Telegram from
Vietnam to Secretary of State (Jan. 19, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at 46, 48 n.6.
233. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 14, 1967), supra note 159, at
1-2.
234. See id. at 1.
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cies. 2 3 5 However, with respect to both foreign affairs and emergency
powers, the Department wanted to strike a proper balance between
executive and legislative authority, not to deny the National Assembly
its legitimate institutional rights. 236 Worries about how the SVN constitution handled the issue of emergency powers were expressed by
other parts of the Johnson Administration as well. 2 3 7
Flanz laid out the U.S. government's position on emergency powers
during his January 19 talk with members of the CA and GVN. 2 38 He
stressed that it was imperative that the executive be able to declare
emergencies if SVN authorities were to handle crises competently. 239
Flanz argued that the constitution, as then written, vitiated governmental effectiveness during national emergencies. 240 He advocated
changing the document so that the president was authorized to declare states of emergency, which would last for fifteen days before National Assembly review, no matter whether the legislature was
convened at the outset of the emergency. 241 After the fifteen days,
according to Flanz, a two-thirds majority vote should be required to
counter the executive's declaration. 242 While the CA delegates in attendance at the dinner acknowledged some validity in Flanz's contentions, they explained how prominent a fear of dictatorship was in the
minds of numerous CA representatives. 243 Reacting sympathetically,
Flanz reiterated the established U.S. policy that the executive's emergency powers should not be dangerously broad.244
D.

Majority Requirement for Elections

Another constitutional issue, which emerged later than the ones
previously discussed but came to have real significance to the Johnson
Administration, was that of the majority or substantial plurality requirement in SVN elections. 245 On December 28, 1966, a meeting,
which included members of the Vietnam Working Group and a special
consultant to President Johnson, was held to discuss the electoral and
235. See id. at 2.
236. See id. at 1-2.
237. See Telegram from Vietnam to Department of State (Jan. 10, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra
note 33, at 29, 30 n.2.
238. See Memorandum of Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 175, at 1-2.
239. See id. at 1.
240. See id.at 1-2.
241. See id. at 2.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Memorandum for the Record, Discussion on Electoral and Political Party Laws
Which Would Assist Political Coalescence in Viet-Nam (Dec. 28, 1966) (on file with DDRS).

2011] THE "LESSONS OF VIETNAM": A CORRECTION

1037

political party laws in SVN. 24 6 Richard Scammon, former director of
the U.S. Census Bureau, reviewed the possible responses to a presidential election in which no one candidate netted a majority of the
votes cast. 2 4 7 He emphasized the need in such situations for SVN to
hold a run-off election for the two top vote-getters. 248 If a subsequent
election were not possible, Scammon advocated having the SVN voters rate the various presidential candidates on the ballot rather than
merely vote for one of them. 2 4 9 Scammon and Roche, while accepting
the idea of permitting a big number of candidates in the election,
stressed that either a run-off election or a ratings scheme must be used
so that the winner be required to gain more than 50% of the vote. 250
In its review of the draft constitution, the Department of State
noted that the document was silent on whether the president and vicepresident must receive an absolute majority in the popular election. 25 1
In the Department's judgment, "[w]hile [the] provision to this effect
could probably be left to [the] election law, we believe it is important
that [the] Chief of State be required to obtain [an] absolute majority
of [the] vote and it may be most appropriate to ensure this in [the]
Constitution itself." 252 On January 18, Washington sent its thanks to
the Embassy for already trying to convince SVN leaders to adopt a
system that mandated that a president receive an absolute majority in
the election. 253 As with all of the major issues of concern to U.S.
policymakers, the issue of an absolute majority requirement in presidential elections came up during Flanz's January 19 dinner
discussion. 254
The U.S. government showed a similar interest in the elections for
the legislature. 255 In a February 2 priority cable to the Embassy, the
Department of State conveyed its observation that, under the CA's
proposed electoral scheme with its "single-member constituency system," candidates for the lower house of representatives could win
election frequently with a relatively small percentage of the vote.2 56 If
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 1-2.
at 1.
at 1-2.
at 2.

251. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 14, 1967) (on file with
NARA).

252. Id. at 3.
253. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 18, 1967) (on file with
NARA).
254. See Memorandum of Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 175, at 2.
255. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Feb. 2, 1967) (on file with NARA).
256. See id. at 1.
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this part of the SVN constitution went unchanged, Washington worried that the communist insurgents could easily gain National Assembly seats with small but regimented groups of voters in the
countryside. 257 It therefore recommended that legislative representatives "should be required through some device to obtain at least [a]
minimum plurality such as 40 percent or more." 258 Again, run-off
elections were floated as a good way to handle such situations. 259
While the Department thought it would be best if its proposals were
placed directly into the constitution, other U.S. officials suggested that
it might be too late for such an alteration to the text and that therefore the Embassy should seek to include the substantial plurality requirement in the election law. 260
On February 7, 1967, Lodge and the Embassy replied straightforwardly that "[w]hile [the] single-member constituency technique has
disadvantages, we believe that [the] opportunity for changing or significantly altering this constitutional provision has passed." 261 They
contended, however, that the election law would probably prevent insurgents being elected through a comprehensive pre-election vetting
process and other measures. 262 According to the Embassy officials in
Saigon, though this was not necessarily the case for presidential runoffs, SVN leaders were likely to see any run-off elections for the lower
chamber as unreasonable and a waste of funds. 263 This assessment did
not affect the continuing Embassy efforts to push for a substantial plurality or absolute majority requirement for presidential elections. 264
The Department of State accepted that the window of opportunity
to advance its goal about elections to the legislature had closed. 265 It
was skeptical, though, of the efficacy of a screening process to eliminate Vietcong candidates and pressed for the substantial plurality requirement to be written into the future election law to address
adequately the communist insurgent threat.266 As the Department admitted candidly, the "[m]ain purpose of [the] adequate plurality requirement is to ensure that no candidate can be elected with [a] small
minority of [the] total vote and to avoid [the] close-knit, well organ257. See id. at 2.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Feb. 7, 1967) (on file with NARA).
id.
id.
id.
Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Feb. 18, 1967) (on file with NARA).
id. at 1.

2011] THE "LESSONS OF VIETNAM": A CORRECTION 1039
ized VC minority [from] exploiting [the] situation." 267 If the SVN
leaders rejected the concept of the run-off election, despite its value in
guaranteeing a substantial plurality, U.S. officials offered a variation
on the rating system as a possibility. 268
V.

OTHER

U.S.

SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS

Per their agreed upon strategy, U.S. policymakers focused their influence and powers of persuasion on those aspects of the SVN constitution that they deemed essential. 269 The issues that seemed to
receive the most attention from the Johnson Administration were covered in Part IV of this Article. 270 However, as has been indicated in
Part III, these were by no means the only constitutional matters discussed by the U.S. government. 27 1 Indeed, in 1966 and 1967, U.S. officials generated a vast amount of commentary on the evolving
constitution in SVN, offering suggestions on and engaging in analysis
of both critical and non-critical areas of the document. If a goal was
not considered primary by U.S. decision makers, this did not mean
that it was discarded but instead that it was only to be pursued if the
primary U.S. goals had already been achieved. 272
On October 10, 1966, the Department of State raised with the Embassy the issue of the treatment of land and labor in the SVN constitution.2 7 3 The Department did not want to attempt to solve SVN's
myriad land problems with provisions in the constitution. 274 Rather,
Washington realized that the CA could not address the woes of the
landless peasantry without also mentioning the urban proletariat in
the document. 275 Therefore, U.S. officials were "inclined to favor
[the] inclusion of [a] general statement in [the] 'bill of right' section of
[the] constitution establishing [the] right of [a] laborer, rural and urban, to reasonable security in his work and to [a] fair return for labor
performed. "276
267. Id.
268. See
269. See
gram from
270. See
271. See
272. See
273. See
NARA).
274. See
275. See
276. Id.

id. at 1-2.
Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25, at 1; TeleBall to Saigon (Sept. 23, 1966), supra note 23, at 1.
supra Part IV.
supra Part III.
Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25, at 3.
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Oct. 10, 1966) (on file with
id.
id.
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The Embassy shared the State Department's desire to have the
SVN constitution broadly articulate a land and labor policy, though
Lodge and the staff were of the opinion that the inclusion of any such
language was strictly a secondary U.S. government goal. 2 7 7 There
were already some positive indications that land and labor interests
would receive some form of protection in the constitution. 278 The
Embassy promised that it would lobby for the Department's suggestion when it could, but stressed that it would not press the matter unless it seemed that the CA was making an absolute mess of the
issue. 279
However, this U.S. goal would in fact run into serious resistance
from SVN leaders. 280 On November 29, the CA declined to "commit[ ] [the nation] to [the] basic principle of ownership by cultivators
of [the] land they farm[,]" opting instead for a weaker pledge. 281
Though it acknowledged the bitter opposition engendered by the proposal, in its communication to the Embassy, Washington stressed the
"desirability of [a] more specific statement on land reform both in order to obtain [the] commitment of future governments to [an] active
land reform program and in terms of [the] image of [the] constitution
internationally. "282
In October 1966, the Department of State also considered the question of religion in the constitution. 283 This issue involved individual
rights, the protection of which had been identified as critical goal by
the U.S. government. 284 Washington wanted the document to protect
personal rights of worship and to prevent governmental discrimination on the basis of religion. 285 However, it emphatically also wished
to avoid a situation in which individual religions claimed unique privileges in the SVN constitution. 286 U.S. officials "hope[d] that CA delegates could resist [the] attempts by the extremist Buddhists, Front of
All Religions, and others to obtain special constitutional treatment
277. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Oct. 12, 1966) (on file with NARA).
278. See id. at 1.
279. See id. at 2.
280. For an indication of the difficulty involved in actually getting land reform into the constitution, see Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Dec. 6, 1966) (on file with NARA). The
copy located in NARA is, unfortunately, incomplete.
281. See id. at 1.
282. Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Feb. 18, 1967), supra note 26, at 3.
283. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Oct. 10, 1966) (on file with
NARA).
284. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Sept. 4, 1966), supra note 25, at 3.
285. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Oct. 10, 1966), supra note 273, at
1.
286. See id.
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which would perpetuate the present projection of religious blocs into
direct political action, thus impeding [the] development of viable,
broadly based political parties." 2 87 In the Department's judgment, as
long as the constitution provided for freedoms of speech, assembly,
and publication, institutional religions would not need any specific
mention in the document.28 8 The Embassy did not think that Washington's main worry about religion in the constitution would materialize and, on October 13, reported that "[a]t this time we expect that
[the] Assembly will draft [a] section on religion, probably in [the] bill
of rights, which will be acceptable to us." 2 8 9
In a December 9 cable, the Department of State again worried
about the rights and liberties of religious believers:
With regard to [the] Assembly's wording on [the] role of religion in
political activity, we are concerned about [the] clause that "religions
are not allowed to use political power". This statement appears at
best ambiguous. Could not a government in power use it as a
weapon to harass a religious group under [the] guise that that religion was attempting to influence government policies or personnel?
Presumably what [the] Assembly wishes to prohibit is [a] religious
group [from] acting as [a] political party; however, [the] provision as
approved by [the] Assembly could be interpreted as prohibiting any
influence by religious groups on political groups or parties. This appears unrealistic and, as stated above, subject to misinterpretation
and abuse. You may wish to point this possibility out to deputies in
your conversations with them, suggesting appropriate rewording
when [the] final draft constitution is being considered. 290
In its response, the Embassy registered its agreement with the Department's views and expressed its confidence that satisfactory language
on this point could be found. 29 1
On January 12, 1967, U.S. officials in Saigon provided Washington
with a copy of the CA's initial draft of the constitution. 2 92 In the following two days, both the Embassy and the Department of State offered analyses of the document. 293 Among other things, Porter and
the Embassy personnel suggested that the draft article discussing the
287. Id. at 1-2.
288. See id. at 2.
289. Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Oct. 13,1966) (on file with NARA).
290. Telegram from Katzenbach to Saigon (Dec. 9, 1966), supra note 204, at 2-3.
291. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Dec. 13, 1966), supra note 206, at 1. The
controversial provision preventing religions from exercising political power was in fact in the
rights section of the constitution. See Memorandum from Miller to Unger (Dec. 5, 1966), supra
note 198, at 1. For Miller's reaction to the CA proposal, see id. at 1-2.
292. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 12, 1967) (on file with NARA).
293. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1967), supra note 26; Telegram
from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 14, 1967), supra note 159.
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national security council might be enhanced by a short statement of
the purpose and composition of that body. 2 9 4 The Department had
comments on a number of draft articles, including those setting up an
inspectorate, governing the time the legislature was given to consider
proposed statutes, and dealing with presidential powers over legislation. 295 In a follow-up to its January 14 review, the Department added
that its "general concern with Art. 118 is that taken together with Articles 100 and 120, [the] Supreme Court is given excessive authority to
suppress political parties on [the] basis of policy and program. This
could be interpreted as [being] inconsistent with [the] concept of national reconciliation." 296 On January 23, the Embassy gave its response to Washington and offered further analysis on the draft SVN
constitution. 297 It is important to note that both the Department and
the Embassy expressed an overall favorable judgment of the draft
constitution. 298
As has been seen, during his January 19 dinner conversation, Flanz
articulated many of the U.S. government's most pressing concerns
about the SVN constitution. 299 One area upon which he touched was
the judiciary. 300 Flanz doubted whether enough qualified personnel
could be found to complete the Supreme Court's various tasks.30 1 He
also questioned the utility of the High Judicial Council as it was set up
by the CA. 3 0 2 Referencing the French experience, Flanz counseled
that the CA not get bogged down trying to distinguish between separation of function and separation of powers.3 0 3 Instead, he argued, the
constitution-drafters ought to focus on devising a practicable and effective system of checks and balances. 304
On March 17, the Department of State issued an exhaustive critique
of the SVN constitution, though Department officials intended for this
document to be used as an aid to the CA as it cleaned up its final
294. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1967), supra note 26, at 2.
295. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 14, 1967), supra note 159, at 2,
4.
296. Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 18, 1967), supra note 253, at 2.
297. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 23, 1967) (on file with NARA).
298. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 1967), supra note 26, at 1; Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Jan. 14, 1967), supra note 162, at 1; see also Memorandum from Komer, Action Program to Promote a Favorable Political Evolution in Saigon (Jan.
12, 1967) (on file with DDRS) ("The CA process is moving along, and the draft constitution [is]
not bad.").
299. See Memorandum of Conversation (Jan. 19, 1967), supra note 173.
300. See id. at 3.
301. See id
302. See id.
303. See id. at 1.
304. See id.
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version rather than as a major statement of U.S. disapproval.305 In
examining the section on rights, the Department noted that it did not
provide the right of confrontation or a guarantee against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. 30 6 It also suggested that the section on
censorship should read, "[C]ensorship will be abolished. Other press
regulations will be prescribed by law."307
When discussing the articles covering the legislature, Department
officials counseled that the rules of parliamentary procedure should
be the product of tradition, not constitutional edict.308 The Department also remarked that "[p]erhaps it is the clear intent of the CA to
do so, but we note an imbalance that while only an absolute Assembly
majority suffices to override a presidential veto, a two-thirds Lower
House majority is necessary to override Upper House objections to a
bill. . . ."309 It opined that the fact that the constitution allows for one
chamber to remain in session while the other has been forced to adjourn may create friction between the two bodies. 310 The Embassy
replied to this review on March 21.311
VI.

COMPARING THE

U.S.

SVN

CONSTITUTION WITH

GOVERNMENT GOALS

The final version of the SVN constitution, promulgated on April 1,
1967, shows that U.S policymakers were largely successful in achieving their objectives for the document but failed in several key respects. 3 1 2 As the United States had wanted, the preamble contained
much aspirational language and a statement of the nation's central
aims:
Confident that the patriotism, indomitable will, and unyielding traditions of the people will assure a radiant future for our country;
Conscious that after many years of foreign domination, followed by
the division of our territory, dictatorship and war, the people of
Viet-Nam must take responsibility before history to perpetuate
those hardy traditions and at the same time to welcome progressive
305. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Mar. 17, 1967) (on file with
NARA). Unlike much U.S. commentary on the SVN constitution, Washington's March 17 cable
went into minute detail. See id. For example, the Department pointed out that "Article 30,
Clauses 3 [&] 4 . . . seem inconsistent with Article 32, Clauses 3 and 5, since synchronization of
election schedules of the two houses appears to be unworkable." Id. at 2.
306. See id. at 1.
307. Id. at 2.
308. See id. at 3.
309. Id.
310. See id. at 4.
311. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Mar. 21, 1967) (on file with NARA).
312. See CURRENT DOCUMENTs, supra note 30, at 897-909.
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ideas in order to establish a republican form of government of the
people, by the people and for the people whose purpose is to unite
the people, unite the territory and assure independence, freedom,
and democracy with justice and altruism for the present and future
generations;
We, 117 Deputies of the National Constituent Assembly representing the people of Viet-Nam, after debate, approve this
Constitution. 3 13
Also in accord with U.S. wishes were the provisions on minorities. 314 Article 2(1) established equality for the SVN citizenry, without regard to sex, political party affiliation, religion, or ethnicity.31 5 It
also promised that "[m]inority compatriots shall receive special support so that they can achieve the same rate of progress as the population as a whole." 316 Article 24 pledged the government to respect
minority traditions and to give them their own courts for cases involving minority customs and habits.31 7 It also stipulated that "[a] law
shall prescribe special rights in order to assist minority compatriots." 31 8 Finally, in Articles 97 and 98, the CA set up an ethnic council
to provide recommendations to the authorities on ethnic-related
issues. 319
U.S. government goals were also met by a robust treatment of citizen rights in Chapter II of the SVN constitution. 320 Article 15(1)
guaranteed the right to work and the right to receive just compensation for one's labor. 321 Chapter II also established as official governmental policy the promotion of property ownership by citizens and the
special support of the poor. 3 2 2 Article 21 committed SVN to "raising
the standard of living of rural citizens, and especially helping farmers
to have farmland." 3 23 Article 9 assured religious liberty for the SVN
people, but made clear that "[n]o religion is recognized as the State
religion. The State is impartial in the development of religions." 324
313. Id. at 897.
314. See id. at 897, 899, 907-08.
315. See id. at 897.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 899.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 907-08. The CA did not squarely address the question of minority representation in the National Assembly, though the generous protections granted minorities in the constitution might well have led a future SVN government to take up this cause. See id. at 897, 899,
907-08.
320. See id. at 897-99.
321. See id. at 898-99.
322. Id. at 899.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 898.
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The U.S. vision for the SVN executive was not disappointed. 3 2 5
While U.S. officials had recommended a presidential system, the president/prime minister scheme ultimately adopted by the CA was also
considered acceptable by the U.S. government. 326 The CA seemed to
have satisfied the U.S. requirement that in such a hybrid system, the
cabinet not be subject to unreasonable pressure from the legislature. 327 The constitution entrusted the president with setting national
policy while it charged the prime minister with leading the government and South Vietnam's administrative agencies. 328 The president
was to select the prime minister and, with the advice of the prime
minister, was then to appoint the other ministers. 329 Article 67(2)
stipulated, "The Prime Minister is responsible before the President for
the execution of national policy." 330 As U.S. officials had recommended, the CA restricted the president to two four-year terms. 331
Much to the relief of U.S. policymakers, Article 64 gave the president the prerogative to declare states of emergency, which would not
be subject to National Assembly review for at least twelve days. 3 3 2
Once this period was over, the legislature could accept, change, or
totally repudiate the president's declaration. 333 Article 65 provided
that during wartime, "when it is impossible to organize elections, the
President, with the approval of two-thirds of the total membership of
the National Assembly, has the right to prolong the terms of some of
the elected bodies of the country and to appoint some province
chiefs." 334 While the legislature apparently had power over the initiation of peace talks, the president was charged with representing South
325. See id. at 903-05.
326. See id. at 903-04.
327. See id. at 901. Article 42 provided that
(1) The National Assembly has the right to recommend the replacement of part or all
of the government by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators.
(2) The recommendation is binding unless the President has special reasons for rejecting it.
(3) In the event of rejection by the President, the National Assembly has the right to
vote final approval of the recommendation by a three-quarters majority vote of the
total number of Representatives and Senators. This recommendation by the National Assembly is binding from the day it is voted.
Id.
328. See id. at 904.
329. See id.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 903.
332. See id. at 904.
333. See id.
334. Id.
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Vietnam in international relations.335 Importantly, Article 60 designated the SVN president as commander-in-chief of the SVN armed
forces.336 The constitution, as U.S. officials had hoped, established a
national security council and an armed forces council, bodies that presumably would harness military ambitions and talents for the public
good.337
While U.S. policymakers were able to attain many of their objectives for the SVN constitution, on three of the four crucial issues discussed in Part IV of this Article, the U.S. government either had to
accept a compromise or was not able to get what it wanted at all. 33 8
Perhaps the most significant defeat was Article 4, which despite all of
the U.S. efforts read: "(1) The Republic of Viet-Nam opposes Communism in all forms. (2) Every activity designed to propagate or implement Communism is prohibited." 3 3 9 While the preamble did not
make any mention of communism, neither did it say anything specific
about national reconciliation. 340 However, because the document did
not explicitly ban pro-communist neutralism, it was not, from the U.S.
perspective, as damaging to the cause of national reconciliation as it
might have been. 341
While U.S. officials had at one point hoped not only for an absolute
majority requirement in presidential elections but also for some sort
of substantial plurality requirement in legislative elections as well, the
final version of the SVN constitution contained neither. 342 Articles
31(1) and 52(1), which governed the election of the president, vicepresident, and members of the lower house, contained nothing about
the percentage of the vote necessary for victory. 343 Article 33(1) on
election to the upper house did mention "list voting" and "plurality"
but had no indication that a substantialplurality was required or that
voters would rate their choices. 344
The U.S. government achieved a partial success on the question of
elected province chiefs. 345 In the end, the CA did articulate a general
principle of local self-government. 346 Articles 71 and 72 provided for
335.
336.
337.
338.

See id. at 901, 904.
See id. at 904.
See id. at 904, 907.
See supra Part IV.

339. CURRENT DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 897.
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elected province chiefs. 3 4 7 However, Article 75 allowed for presidential removal of province chiefs "if they violate the Constitution, laws
of the nation, or national policy[,]" a device which presumably could
address the problem of Vietcong capture. 3 4 8 Also comforting to U.S.
policymakers was the fact that Article 65 gave the president a limited
ability to appoint province chiefs during wartime and that Article 114
permitted the first president elected under the constitution to pick all
province chiefs during his first term.3 4 9
Despite these shortcomings, the U.S. government's reaction to the
end of the constitution-creating process in SVN was not negative and,
at times, was in fact enthusiastic. 3 5 0 For example, in a secret cable to
Saigon on March 18, 1967, the Department of State expressed its view
that the "[c]ompletion by [the] CA of its work on [the] constitution is
most welcome news and you are to be congratulated on your efforts
quietly to support the process." 35 1 Earlier that day, the Embassy had
sent the more sober view to Washington that the National Assembly
was given more power by the constitution than the United States
would have hoped, but that overall the document was acceptable from
the U.S. perspective. 352 In a personal telegram to President Johnson
on March 15, Ambassador Lodge expressed a similar conclusion.353
When discussing the matter with Prime Minister Ky, Lodge used more
stirring language. 354 As he reported the conversation in a telegram to
Washington,
I told him that this was no time to be stressing minor defects. The
constitutional convention could sit for ten years and would still not
produce a perfect document. Our constitution is not perfect. We
had amended it many times. They could amend their own constitution in the future. The point to remember was that [the] government under this constitution would lead Viet-Nam up onto a new
plateau. The constitution provided an opportunity to take the first
step. If they did not take that first step, they would be back in the
same old squirrel's cage of coups and conspiracy. 355
347. See id. at 905.
348. See id.
349. See id. at 904, 909.
350. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Mar. 18, 1967) (on file with NARA);
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Mar. 18, 1967) (on file with NARA); Telegram from Lodge to President Johnson (Mar. 15, 1967), supra note 71.
351. See Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Saigon (Mar. 18, 1967), supra note 350, at
1.
352. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Mar. 18, 1967), supra note 350, at 3.
353. See Telegram from Lodge to President Johnson (Mar. 15, 1967), supra note 71, at 2.
354. See Telegram from Saigon to Secretary of State (Mar. 25, 1967) (on file with NARA).
355. Id. at 1-2.
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While Lodge's remarks in this context should perhaps be taken with a
grain of salt, there is little doubt that, as Part II of this Article demonstrated, U.S. policymakers viewed the transition to constitutional government in SVN-regardless of whatever individual defects the
constitution might have contained-as a vital development in the war
effort.35 6 They reconfirmed this judgment at the Guam meetings in
March 1967 after the U.S. government knew what the final form of
the document would be.35 7
VII.

ASSESSING

U.S.

POLICY TOWARDS THE

SVN

CONSTITUTION

While critics are undoubtedly right that the United States made a
number of mistakes in Vietnam, U.S. conduct towards the creation of
the SVN constitution of 1967 does not seem to be one of them. Certainly, charges of heavy handedness in the matter, such as those advanced by Laird, do not seem justified. At the outset, U.S.
policymakers made a deliberate decision to seek to influence only
those aspects of the SVN constitution they considered vital and to
leave the rest of the drafting process in the hands of SVN leaders.
While the final SVN constitution touched on a large number of topics,
the documentary record suggests that the Johnson Administration focused its attention and influence on a relatively small set of issues.
Though U.S. officials did produce a substantial body of constitutional
observations and commentary, the U.S. government emphatically did
not seek to correct every aspect of the SVN constitution that it found
problematic.
Perhaps most damning to Laird's position is the fact that even when
the United States brought its influence to bear, it did not always get
what it wanted. Indeed, in several key respects, the SVN constitution
promulgated on April 1, 1967, ran counter to U.S. plans for the document. It may be that, as a theoretical matter, the creation of a constitution is a strictly internal matter for a state and that no foreign power
should have anything to do with the process. However, it is hard to
imagine that any country investing huge amounts of money and indeed, even fighting a war in another nation as the United States was
then doing in Vietnam, would make no attempt whatsoever to influ356. See supra Part II.
357. See Memorandum for the Record (Mar. 20, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at 268, 272;
Memorandum for the Record, Working Notes on U.S. Delegation Session of Guam Conference
(Mar. 21, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at 274, 280. This view was expressed again after the
constitution's promulgation by the new U.S. ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker. See Telegram from Vietnam to the Department of State (May 30, 1967), in 5 FRUS, supra note 33, at
455, 455.
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ence the drafting of the nation's constitution. When considering the
question of U.S. interference, it is worth noting the encounter that
Lodge had in April 1967 with Dr. Phan Quang Dan, a CA delegate
and prominent SVN civilian leader.3 58 Lodge recounted his conversation with Dan in a highly classified telegram for President Johnson:
Noting that under both the Japanese and the French, the
Vietnamese had simply received orders reflecting the desires of the
colonial governors, he remarked how completely different the
American way had been, saying that we did not give orders, but had
genuinely sought to help them and advise them when they wanted
help and advice. Citing the Constitution as an example, he said that
it was truly a Vietnamese document and not a "dictated" Constitution from the Americans as some critics had alleged. In Dan's opinion, we had been wise not to try to dictate what language should be
in the Constitution. He said: "You have not been in evidence; you
have not made statements, but you have had great influence." He
added that for a country as powerful as the United States, it was
better that our influence not be exercised directly.35 9
The U.S. government genuinely sought to promote democracy and
constitutionalism in SVN, which the SVN people seemed to want considering the opposition to the Diem autocracy still present in their
minds. When U.S. officials deviated from these principles, such as
when they lobbied for the appointment rather than the election of
province chiefs, it was in the interest of winning a struggle to which
both the CA and the GVN were fully committed. Reasonably
enough, almost all of America's most important goals for the SVN
constitution were related to winning the war. U.S. officials argued
strenuously against the anti-communism article because they feared it
would hinder the peaceful reintegration of communist insurgents into
a non-communist SVN. The U.S. government opposed the election of
province chiefs because of concerns about the effect such an institution might have on the successful prosecution of the war in the SVN
countryside. Similarly, U.S. officials pushed the idea of a substantial
plurality requirement for elections because of worries about Vietcong
takeover of legislative seats. Finally, it is clear that the type of executive promoted by the United States, with its powers and control over
the military, was well-calculated to fight the enemy effectively without
courting too closely the dangers of dictatorship and its attendant instability. In taking this war-centered approach to the constitution, U.S.
policy in Vietnam differed in important ways from its policy in other
instances in which the United States sought to influence the drafting
358. See Telegram from Lodge to President Johnson (Apr. 5, 1967) (on file with DDRS).
359. Id. at 2.
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of another nation's constitution. For example, when the Bonn Parliamentary Council drafted West Germany's basic law after the Second
World War, U.S. policy was almost exactly the opposite, with the
United States promoting various devices, including an emphasis on
federalism in the document, to prevent Berlin from again being able
to fight a war efficiently. 360
Because SVN fell to its enemies in 1975, the SVN constitution of
1967 is unlikely ever to be held up as a model of U.S. constitutionbuilding the way that the post-World War II West German and Japanese documents are. Yet, in many ways, this is simply an unfair instance of, to use a colloquialism, "nothing succeeds like success." The
U.S. government policy towards the SVN constitution seems an appropriate and legitimate one. The goals of the Johnson Administration for the document were reasonable, and the flexibility and soft
touch exhibited by U.S. officials when dealing with SVN constitutional
issues ought not to be forgotten. One could make the case that in fact,
if the United States continues actively to influence foreign constitutions, there is much to emulate in its SVN constitutional policy.
However, none of this changes the fact that the U.S. embassy in
Saigon, from which so much constitutional analysis originated, was occupied by North Vietnamese troops less than a decade after the promulgation of the SVN constitution. Perhaps, then, the most important
lesson for U.S. decision makers from the episode is that designing a
constitution is but one part of the overall process of building a healthy
state. Regardless of how good the SVN constitution was or how
nuanced the policy U.S. officials had towards the document, SVN was
still conquered by its enemy eight years after the document's creation.
Much more is needed for a successful foreign policy.

360. See Mattei Ion Radu, German Lessons for Iraq and Beyond, 35 S.U. L. REv. 373 (2008).

